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This article describes a 2-systems model that explains social behavior as a joint func-
tion of reflective and impulsive processes. In particular, it is assumed that social behav-
ior is controlled by 2 interacting systems that follow different operating principles. The
reflective system generates behavioral decisions that are based on knowledge about
facts and values, whereas the impulsive system elicits behavior through associative
links and motivational orientations. The proposed model describes how the 2 systems
interact at various stages of processing, and how their outputs may determine behavior
in a synergistic or antagonistic fashion. It extends previous models by integrating moti-
vational components that allow more precise predictions of behavior. The implications
of this reflective–impulsive model are applied to various phenomena from social psy-
chology and beyond. Extending previous dual-process accounts, this model is not lim-
ited to specific domains of mental functioning and attempts to integrate cognitive, moti-
vational, and behavioral mechanisms.
In the history of attempts to discover the causes of
human behavior, the most widespread explanations are
based on the assumption that human beings do what
they believe is good for them. Thus, they are construed
as “rational animals” capable of recognizing the value
or utility of their actions.
At the same time, however, it is obvious that human
beings do not always act this way; that is, under certain
circumstances people behave in ways that do not reflect
their values. To account for this phenomenon, to which
the Greek philosophers gave the name akrasia (e.g.,
Mele, 1992), several strategies have been pursued. The
first strategy assumes ignorance or lack of knowledge
on the part of the actor. Socrates, for example, claimed
that if people only knew what is good for them, they
would act accordingly. A similar position is held by
modern economists who imply that irrational decisions
reflect a lack of appropriate information (Friedman,
1976). The second strategy postulates more than one set
of principles that may control human action. For exam-
ple, a behavior may occur mindlessly (Langer, Blank, &
Chanowitz, 1978) or automatically; that is, without di-
rectingmuchattention to theutilityofanoutcome,aper-
son may act the way he or she has acted many times be-
fore. Such habitual behaviors were the focus of many
psychological theories in which the frequency and re-
cency of previous executions of a given behavior were
seen as primary determinants (e.g., Hull, 1943). The
third strategy has been to understand human behavior as
a function of drives. In particular, basic needs that are bi-
ologically rooted, such as hunger, thirst, or reproduc-
tion, are seen as major forces. Their strength may over-
ride considerations of utility and determine behavior in
an immediate fashion.
Although most psychological theories have focused
on one of these aspects, some have acknowledged that
behaviors may be multiply determined. Most promi-
nently,Freud(e.g.,1933/1949)describedhumanbehav-
ior as controlled by a “psychic apparatus” that includes
several operating principles: a superego composed of a
person’s values and norms, an id that operates in accor-
dance with the basic drives a person is endowed with,
and an ego that integrates and often reconciles the forces
from the superego and the id. Thus, Freudian theory also
describes how different processes may interact. In par-
ticular, Freud deserves credit for emphasizing the im-
portance of unconscious processes in the determination
ofbehavior.AlthoughFreud’s thinkinghasgreatlystim-
ulated psychological theorizing, evidence for the pro-
posed mechanisms was largely anecdotal or based on
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clinical case studies; that is, little evidence has been
available to evaluate the postulated processes.
More recently, the conviction that human behavior
is guided by more than one underlying process has led
to a series of research programs that have resulted in a
number of dual-process theories. This converging evi-
dence has been extensively discussed by many authors
who contributed to a recent book on dual-process theo-
ries in social psychology edited by Chaiken and Trope
(1999; for more complex theories of mental processes,
see, e.g., Kuhl & Goschke, 1994). Of course, these the-
ories are not entirely unique but share a considerable
number of features. In a systematic comparison, Smith
and DeCoster (2000) juxtaposed the nine most promi-
nent models and identified their common and distinc-
tive characteristics.
Most important, all models propose two modes of
information processing that are distinguished, accord-
ing to Smith and DeCoster (2000, p. 111, Table 1), by
the following characteristics: rule-based processing
“Draws on symbolically represented rules…That are
structured by language and logic…And can be learned
in just one or a few experiences…Occurs optionally
when capacity and motivation are present…And often
with conscious awareness of steps of processing;” in
contrast, associative processing “Draws on associa-
tions…That are structured by similarity and contigu-
ity…And are learned over many experiences…Occurs
automatically…And preconsciously, with awareness
of the result of processing.”
Whereas these characteristics are shared by the ma-
jor two-process models, Smith and DeCoster (2000)
saw the most substantive difference in whether the two
typesofprocessesoccursimultaneouslyor inamutually
exclusive fashion. In addition, the existing models are
distinct in that they focus on different phenomena and
employ different terminology to describe various as-
pects of the two types of processing. For example,
Chaiken, Liberman, and Eagly (1989) as well as Petty
and Cacioppo (1986), who are among the proponents of
dual-process models, spoke about heuristic/peripheral
and systematic/central processing and applied their
model to the domain of attitude change. In the spontane-
ous mode of Fazio’s (1986) model of attitude access,
well-learned attitudes are assumed to be automatically
activated by attitude objects. Only if sufficient motiva-
tion and opportunity are present, will deliberative pro-
cessing determine the evaluation of an object. Devine
(1989) focused on stereotyping and assumed either au-
tomatic processes or more effortful stereotype suppres-
sion. Gilbert (1989) distinguished between correspon-
dent inferences and attributional thinking to explain
phenomena of person perception and biases in causal at-
tribution. Martin, Seta, and Crelia (1990) were inter-
ested in social judgments and juxtaposed automatic
contextual influences and more strategic and effortful
attempts at correcting them. Epstein (1991) differenti-
atedbetweenexperiential and rationalprocessesandap-
plied his theory to general mechanisms of thinking.
Finally, Sloman (1996), whose model serves as a con-
ceptual orientation for other dual-process approaches,
invoked associative and rule-based processes to account
for human reasoning.
Over the years, dual-process models have been re-
fined and updated in various ways. For example, Smith
and DeCoster (2000) have integrated new findings from
research on memory systems (J. L. McClelland,
McNaughton, & O’Reilly, 1995) to explain how asso-
ciative and rule-based processing may be rooted in more
basic cognitive structures. Lieberman, Gaunt, Gilbert,
and Trope (2002) described a cybernetically oriented
two-process model while integrating findings from neu-
roscience. Thus far, however, dual-process models have
directed little attention to the behavioral consequences
of the mental mechanisms they describe, and they do not
provide an alternative to rational models of human be-
havior. In particular, they are silent on the problem of
akrasia. Although there are some accounts that focus
primarily on behavior (Bargh, 1990), they do not pro-
videan integration intoacomprehensivemodelof social
cognition. This, precisely, is the aim of this article,
which attempts to incorporate insights from motiva-
tional science (Higgins & Kruglanski, 2000) into the
general dual-process idea.
Although Smith and DeCoster’s (2000) survey is
certainly not complete (cf. Wilson, Lindsey, & School-
er, 2000), it is obvious that the processes described in
these models focus on judgments and information pro-
cessing, whereas behavior does not play an integral
role. In other words, behavior is implied in these mod-
els primarily to the extent that it is preceded by a judg-
ment or a decision. However, behavior is known to oc-
cur without such antecedents. For example,
judgment-based behaviors may become habitualized
through frequent execution and be carried out inde-
pendent of the implications of the original judgment
(Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Ouelette & Wood, 1998).
In addition, strong motivational forces may drive a be-
havior in a direction that is inconsistent with an actor’s
beliefs and values (Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999; Strack
& Neumann, 1996). However, such direct influences
on behavior have links to mechanisms described in the
models summarized by Smith and DeCoster (2000).
Therefore, it seemed necessary to integrate behavioral,
motivational, and cognitive components into a
two-system model of social behavior.
Along with others (Kahneman & Frederick, 2002),
we assume that the processes operate in parallel in-
stead of being consecutively invoked, and we posit that
the two systems are concurrently active and compete
for control of an overt response. Thus, in contrast to
most of the dual-process models previously described,
the proposed model is a two-systems model (see also,
Gilovich & Griffin, 2002) of social behavior.
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To enable this model to go beyond explaining the
generation of social judgments, we attempt to integrate
elements from other research programs that provide
links to social behavior. Specifically, the work by Nor-
man and Shallice (1986), Cacioppo, Priester, and
Berntson, (1993), as well as Gollwitzer (1999) provided
important conceptual elements that added a motiva-
tional dimension to the model. In particular, we suggest
that behavior is a function of schemata that are jointly
controlled by environmental input and superordinate at-
tention (Norman & Shallice, 1986), and we propose the
existence of a motivational orientation that acts as a be-
havioral catalyst and relates valence to approach and
avoidance (Cacioppo et al., 1993). To bridge temporal
gaps between a decision and its behavioral implementa-
tion, we integrated a mechanism of intending
(Gollwitzer, 1999). In addition, we propose that the de-
privation of basic needs influences spontaneous evalua-
tion and preactivates behavioral schemata relevant for
the satisfaction of the deprived needs.
Taken together, the value of this model is not that it is
new in each of its components. Rather, we see its merits
in its attempts to integrate elements from existing theo-
ries and to describe how they interact at different stages
of processing. Most important, we try to tie mental pro-
cesses to social behavior in a nontrivial way; that is, we
do not assume that behavior follows inevitably from a
decision and therefore does not deserve attention be-
yond its cognitive precursors. Instead, we construe so-
cial behavior as the result of several determinants that
may operate in accord or conflict with each other.
Basic Properties and Functions
For reasons of clarity, the proposed model is de-
scribed in 10 theses (see Figure 1 for an overview). As
mentioned before, several components are shared by
existing dual-process models. The descriptions of
those components are somewhat briefer than of those
we believe to be unique to this model.
Thesis 1: Basic assumption. Social behavior is
the effect of the operation of two distinct systems
of information processing: a reflective system
and an impulsive system. The systems can be
specified by different principles of representa-
tion and information processing.
In the reflective system, behavior is elicited as a con-
sequence of a decision process. Specifically, knowledge
about the value and the probability of potential conse-
quences is weighed and integrated to reach a preference
for one behavioral option. If a decision is made, the re-
flective system activates appropriate behavioral sche-
mata through a self-terminating mechanism of intend-
ing. In contrast, the impulsive system activates
behavioral schemata through spreading activation,
which may originate from perceptual input or from re-
flective processes. As described in James’ (1890)
ideo-motor principle (see also Lotze, 1852), a behavior
may be elicited without the person’s intention or goal. In
addition, the activation of behavioral schemata may be
moderatedbymotivationalorientationsordeprivation.
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Figure 1. Overview of the reflective–impulsive model. Note that reflective and impulsive processes are represented by solid or broken
lines, respectively.
Thesis 2: Parallel operation. Both systems oper-
ate in parallel. However, there is an asymmetry
such that the impulsive system is always en-
gaged in processing (by itself or parallel to oper-
ations of the reflective system) whereas the re-
flective system may be disengaged.
This model assumes that information entering the
perceptual gates will always be processed in the impul-
sive system. However, the impact of that information
depends to a great extent on the preactivation of those
structures in the impulsive system in which the infor-
mation is represented. Depending on its intensity and
the attention it receives, a stimulus may also enter the
reflective system. In that case, impulsive and reflective
processing occurs in parallel, and are assumed to inter-
act at various stages of processing.
Thesis 3: Capacity. The reflective system re-
quires a high amount of cognitive capacity.
Therefore, distraction as well as extremely high
or low levels of arousal will interfere with its op-
eration. In contrast, the impulsive system re-
quires little cognitive capacity and may control
behavior under suboptimal conditions. As a con-
sequence, processes of the reflective system are
disturbed more easily than those of the impulsive
system.
One of the greatest advantages of the impulsive sys-
tem is that it is fast, requires no or little cognitive effort,
and has a low threshold for processing incoming infor-
mation, whereas the opposite holds for reflective oper-
ations. The reflective–impulsive model shares this as-
sumption with almost every dual-process model, and
relevant evidence is reviewed elsewhere (see, e.g.,
Chaiken & Trope, 1999; Smith & DeCoster, 2000).
However, we emphasize the role of arousal for a proper
functioning reflective system. Resembling the
Yerkes–Dodson Law (Yerkes & Dodson, 1908), we
propose that the reflective system operates most effi-
ciently at intermediate levels of arousal. On one hand,
high levels of arousal facilitate well-practiced, domi-
nant responses (Hull, 1943; Zajonc, 1965). Recent
findings have demonstrated that arousal also affects so-
cial judgments and perception, in that it enhances the
influence of stereotypic and evaluative associations
(e.g., Bodenhausen, 1993; Paulhus & Lim, 1994).
More important, this effect has been recently attributed
to a weakening influence of high arousal on controlled
or reflective processes (e.g., Baron, 2000; Lambert et
al., 2003). On the other hand, very low levels of
arousal, as in the state of drowsiness, are associated
with poor reflective processing and poor self-control
(e.g., Baumeister & Heatherton, 1996).
Representation, Storage, and
Processing of Information
Thesis 4: Relations between elements. Elements
in the two systems are connected by different
types of relations. In the reflective system, ele-
ments are connected through semantic relations
to which a truth value is assigned. In the impul-
sive system, the relations are associative links
between elements and are formed according to
the principles of contiguity and similarity.
The world as well as inner states of the organism are
represented in different ways in the two systems. In the
impulsive system, information is represented in pat-
terns of activation in an associative store. In contrast,
the reflective system is capable of forming proposi-
tional representations by connecting one or more ele-
ments through the instantiation of relational schemata
to which a truth value is attached. Of course, represen-
tations in both systems are ultimately implemented
within a neuronal network; the difference between
simple associations and propositional representations
therefore refers to the computational level of cognitive
modeling (Marr, 1982).1
Associative Links and Structures in
the impulsive system
In thismodel, the impulsive systemisconceivedofas
a simple associative network. In accordance with most
otherassociative-networkmodels (seeSmith,1998),we
assume that the links between elements have different
strengths that are stable and change only gradually
through learning. If an element is activated, activation
spreads to other elements in proportion to the strength of
the link. The activation of elements in the network can
vary rapidly. The accessibility of a content will be in-
creasedby the frequencyandrecencyofprioractivation.
In this way, an element acquires an activation potential
(Higgins, 1996) that reduces the amount of additional
activationnecessaryfor retrievalor furtherprocessing.
In general, links are created or strengthened if stim-
uli are presented or activated in close temporal or spa-
tial proximity. The resulting links reflect correlations
between aspects of the environment and cognitive, af-
fective, or motor reactions, without representing the
causes of such multimodal correlations. As a conse-
quence, structures emerge in the impulsive system that
bind together frequently co-occurring features and
form associative clusters. In essence, we assume that
the associative store of the impulsive system works like
a simple memory system (see Johnson & Hirst, 1991),
which slowly forms enduring, nonpropositional repre-
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1Marr (1982) distinguished between the computational,
algorithmical, and implementational level of cognitive processes.
sentations of the typical properties of the environment
over many learning trials (see J. L. McClelland et al.,
1995; Smith & DeCoster, 2000). The impulsive system
has low flexibility but is fast and needs no attentional
resources.
In addition, associative links can be formed through
reflective operations. This is possible because every
propositional representation in the reflective system
activates corresponding contents in the impulsive sys-
tem. As a result, elements that do not co-occur in real-
ity but are often related to each other in the reflective
system will also become associatively linked in the im-
pulsive system (cf. Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Thus, se-
mantic concepts will emerge in the impulsive system
through frequent propositional categorizations. It is
important to note that the links in the impulsive system,
different from some other network models (e.g., Col-
lins & Quillian, 1969), are not assumed to have any se-
mantic meaning by themselves. Therefore, the only re-
lation between two or more elements is that of a mutual
activation.
For example, if we see an elderly person, perceptual
features such as hair color or body posture may activate
specific elements in the impulsive system (see Figure
2). Because such elements have previously been paired
with other features that are correlated with advanced
age, a whole cluster of elderly features will be acti-
vated. As a consequence, contents of the elderly stereo-
type will be more readily accessible and may guide
subsequent processing. For example, the concept of
slowness may become activated in the impulsive sys-
tem and reflect our direct or indirect experiences with
elderly people.
Although the connections between elements in the
impulsive system do not carry a truth value and do not
reflect declarative knowledge about elderly people be-
ing slow, the associative link between elderly and slow
may bias perception and influence behavior if it is acti-
vated. Moreover, it is possible that motor programs that
have been executed frequently in connection with el-
derly people in the past may again be activated. Re-
search on the connection between perception and be-
havior bolsters the idea that semantic concepts can be
directly connected to motor programs (e.g., Bargh,
Chen, & Burrows, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001).
Recent findings on the interplay of gestures and lexical
access indicates that this connection is bidirectional
(e.g., Krauss, Chen, & Gottesman, 2000). Associative
clusters in the impulsive system can be hierarchically
structured and can therefore differ in abstractness. As a
consequence, clusters may resemble either concrete
perceptual concepts or abstract semantic concepts or
schemata.
Processes in the impulsive system may be accompa-
nied by an experiential state of awareness; that is, with-
out necessarily knowing its origin, people may experi-
ence a feeling with its distinct phenomenal quality. For
example, a person may have a visual perception of
lightness or darkness, a pleasant or unpleasant feeling,
or the experience of pain or familiarity without know-
ing the concepts or categories of light, pleasantness,
pain, or familiarity. Thus, the impulsive system can be
understood as a system of experiential primacy, in
which affective and nonaffective feelings are generated
quickly and without syllogistic processes of inference
(see also Zajonc, 1980).
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Figure 2. Activation of a hypothetical elderly cluster in the impulsive system. The perception of gray hair leads to a higher accessibility
of associated contents and may facilitate associated behavior.
The Generation of Knowledge
Through Propositional
Categorizations and Syllogistic
Inferences in the Reflective System
The impulsive system can be thought of as long-term
memory, whereas the reflective system has the proper-
ties of a temporary storage in that the amount of infor-
mation that can be represented at any given time is lim-
ited, and the representation will fade if it is not rehearsed
(Baddeley, 1986). The reflective system generates de-
clarative knowledge by assigning perceptual input to a
semantic category. Unlike simple associative links and
structures, knowledge in the reflective system consists
of one or more elements to which a relational schema is
applied. Most important, a truth value is assigned to that
relation.Asaconsequence, this systemrepresents states
of theworldor theorganisminapropositional format. In
this endeavor, the reflective system is driven by the prin-
ciple of consistency as it strives to avoid or remedy in-
consistencies between its elements (Gawronski &
Strack, in press). An important feature of representa-
tions in the reflective system is that they can be flexibly
generated and changed. Thus, the reflective system can
solve a multitude of tasks, such as reasoning, planning,
or mental simulation. However, it is slower than the im-
pulsive system and requires attentional resources.
How are such representations generated? We assume
that the elements of the proposition—that is, one or
more concepts and the relation that is applied to them—
are retrieved from the impulsive system. The reflective
systemgeneratessemanticorepisodicknowledgebyas-
signinga truthvalue to theconceptand the relation.Take
again the perception of an elderly person. The perceiv-
able features have spread activation to the elderly
concept in the impulsive system. To generate a proposi-
tional categorization, the relational schema of category
membership (is a) will be retrieved from the impulsive
system and combined with the label elderly and the rep-
resentation of the perceptual input, in this case the visual
representation of the person. Thus, the propositional
representation this is an elderly person is generated (for
a detailed computational account on how relations and
their arguments are bound together to compose proposi-
tions, see Hummel & Holyoak, 2003; see Figure 3).
The number of relations that can be applied to these
contents is nearly infinite. Beside simple logical rela-
tions, such as is a, is not, or implies, there are also more
complex and abstract relations, such as causality. In ad-
dition, there are many social relations such as friend,
enemy, spouse, or partner. Of course, new relations can
develop as a person’s knowledge expands.
Once knowledge has been generated, syllogistic2
rules are applied to draw inferences that go beyond the
information given (Bruner, 1973). For example, a per-
son may wonder how wise an elderly person is. Cate-
gorical knowledge about the elderly may be derived
from the categorization of a given person as elderly.
The quality wise may then be inferred based on this
categorization. Note again the fundamental difference
to the mere activation of the concept, which facilitates
the inference but does not generate knowledge about
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Figure 3. Schematic representation of a propositional categorization. The concepts elderly and person, as well as the relation is a, are re-
trieved from the impulsive system and transformed into a proposition.
2The term syllogistic is meant to refer to all types of rules that are
usedfor the transferof truth fromthepremises to theconclusion.There
are no implications about the validity of such syllogistic inferences.
elderly people being wise. This becomes particularly
apparent in attributional thinking such that the charac-
terization of a particular behavior may spontaneously
activate categories that correspond with personality
traits (Uleman, 1999). However, these categories may
eventually not be used to categorize the person because
the context implies alternative causes of the same be-
havior (e.g., Trope, 1986).
Operations of the reflective system are accompa-
nied by a noetic state of awareness, which consists of
knowledge that something is or is not the case.3 A
noetic state of awareness may be accompanied by an
experiential state of awareness, which consists of a par-
ticular feeling. For example, the process of trying to
answer an almanac question may be accompanied by a
feeling of knowing (Koriat, 1993).
The Role of Accessibility
The assignment of a relation to elements is strongly
influenced by the accessibility of a category (Higgins,
Rholes, & Jones, 1977). For example, the belief that a
particular person is slow depends on the ease with
which the concept slow comes to mind, which, in turn,
depends on the associative strength between the per-
ceptual input and the concept, that is, on the recency
and the frequency of their joint activation. Of course,
more elaborate inferential strategies that are the basis
of further transformational processing may also be ap-
plied to generate propositional knowledge (i.e., causal
attribution or hypothesis testing).
Because the reflective system uses contents from
the impulsive system, reflective operations will alter
the accessibility of these contents. As a consequence,
subsequent operations in the reflective system will be
influenced by their predecessors. An example of this
influence comes from recent work on the psychologi-
cal mechanisms underlying the so-called anchoring
bias (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974), which refers to the
assimilation of an absolute judgment toward the stan-
dard of a preceding comparative judgment. In a series
of studies, Mussweiler and Strack (see Strack &
Mussweiler, 1997; for a review, see Mussweiler &
Strack, 1999) demonstrated that this bias results from
the use of information that has been selectively acti-
vated during the comparative judgment task preceding
the absolute judgment.
Contents of Representations and
Noetic Decisions
The content of propositional representations can
take many different forms. It may be objects from the
outside world but also experiences that come “from
within” (Bless & Forgas, 2000). In particular, feelings
of different qualities may enter into the reflective sys-
tem if they are propositionally categorized and contex-
tually qualified (e.g., Schwarz & Clore, 1983). A good
example of how feelings that emerge from impulsive
processing can enter reflective processes and even de-
termine choice comes from a study by Bechara,
Damasio, Tranel, and Damasio (1997). In this experi-
ment, participants had to choose cards from four decks,
two of which offered high gains at the risk of an occa-
sional high loss, while the other decks offered lower
gains but with a smaller risk of a loss. Overall, the less
risky deck led to a higher payoff.
When participants were asked to choose from the
four decks, they reported having a feeling which of the
decks were good and bad long before they could name
the payoff matrix of the game. This impulsive reaction
to the playing situation was also mirrored by changes
in skin conductance before participants chose a risky
card, and participants frequently based their choice on
these feelings. Another informational basis for the gen-
eration of knowledge about others and about the self is
observed behavior. As described by attribution and
self-perception theory (Bem, 1967; Kelley, 1967), peo-
ple may infer internal states (such as attitudes) from
their own behavior or that of others, and from the con-
text in which it occurs.
It is important to note that noetic decisions can be
made not only about what is the case but also about
what is good or bad, because the syllogistic rules also
apply to evaluative judgments, such as attitudes (see
Schwarz & Bohner, 2001); that is, a person may infer
that something is good or bad based on premises with
evaluative content. To arrive at an evaluative decision,
it is neither necessary nor sufficient that congruent af-
fect is elicited or that the person has an affective expe-
rience. This also relates to the distinction between in-
stant utility and the utility judgments that concern the
past or the future. In particular, Kahneman and collab-
orators (for a review see Kahneman, 1999) showed that
evaluations of past situations may drastically differ
from what was actually experienced. In retrospect, in-
dividuals seem to rely primarily on the frequency and
the extremity of negative or positive peaks in experi-
enced utility, thereby neglecting the duration of
hedonic experience (but see Schreiber & Kahneman,
2000). Judged or remembered utility refers to a noetic
judgment, whereas experienced utility accrues from an
impulsive reaction to hedonically relevant situations.
To be sure, such experiences may accompany the
reflective processing of evaluative (and factual) infor-
mation and facilitate or inhibit reflective processes. For
example, a recent set of experiments (Greene,
Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001) found
that incongruent affect may interfere with evaluative
judgments. Specifically, research participants had to
judge whether it was justifiable to sacrifice one human
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3The term noetic was introduced to experimental psychology by
Tulving (1985), who differentiated between anoetic, noetic, and
autonoetic kinds of consciousness.
life to save five. The scenarios were constructed such
that more or less negative affect was elicited by consid-
ering the sacrifice. This was checked by fMRI record-
ings of the brain during decision making. It was found
that under the high negative affect condition, more
time was required to make incompatible decisions (i.e.,
justifying the sacrifice) than compatible decisions (i.e.,
not justifying the sacrifice). When no or less negative
affect was elicited by the decision task, the response
time did not differ as a function of the outcome of the
decision. In congruence with a recent model of moral
judgment (Haidt, 2001), this finding suggests that peo-
ple may use their affect as a basis of such a judgment,
and that the affect may be in conflict with consider-
ations based solely on value and expectancy.
Finally, reflective operations may instigate or mod-
erate affect. Although in some cases merely perceiving
a specific situation is sufficient to activate affect in the
impulsive system (Le Doux, 1995; Zajonc, 1980), in
other circumstances considerable reasoning is neces-
sary to infer the affective relevance of a situation (Laz-
arus, 1984). In this case, the reflective–impulsive
model assumes that reflection activates affect-specific
contents in the impulsive system that then lead to the
experiential state. However, knowing that something is
good (or bad) does not necessarily imply a positive (or
negative) feeling. In fact, the insight that a specific ac-
tion might be good can be accompanied by a bad feel-
ing, for example the upcoming appointment with one’s
dentist. On the other hand, positive feelings toward an
action may be accompanied by a negative evaluation of
what one may be about to do (i.e., temptation).
Representing What Is Not the Case:
Negations and the Future
As is outlined later, the assumption of different rep-
resentational principles in the reflective and impulsive
system has various implications for current topics in
social and cognitive psychology. However, it also af-
fects capabilities that are fundamental to our thinking
and acting. Specifically, the two representational prin-
ciples contribute to a deeper understanding of how we
comprehend that something is not the case (i.e., how
we negate), and how we think about the future.
Negation. Negating—that is, reversing the truth
value of a proposition—is not only a widespread tool
of thinking (e.g., Wason & Jones, 1963) but also a con-
venient means of everyday communication (e.g., Mac-
Donald & Just, 1989). Because negations are proposi-
tional statements (Horn, 1989; Mall, 1975), boundary
conditions for their successful computation can be de-
rived from the reflective–impulsive model. Most im-
portant, Thesis 4 implies that the cognitive procedure
of negating can only be executed in the reflective sys-
tem. Consequently, only if there is sufficient process-
ing time, intention, and cognitive capacity to extract
the meaning of a negation (e.g., no money) will the re-
flective system be engaged and the task successfully
completed. However, if one of these conditions is not
met, the negation may be processed only in the impul-
sive system. In this case, the negated concept (e.g.,
money) and the negating qualifier (e.g., no or not) will
become activated in the impulsive system, however
they will not be applied to the concept. Consequently,
the immediate effects of processing this information
will be identical to those of processing the same infor-
mation in an affirmed format or even without a quali-
fier attached to it.
We are certainly not the first to propose that process-
ing negations is a resource dependent process. A great
number of studies demonstrates that negations slow
down cognition (Wason, 1959) and are prone to error
(Fiedler, Armbruster, Nickel, Walther, & Asbeck, 1996;
Ross, Lepper, & Hubbard, 1975; Wegner, Coulton, &
Wenzlaff, 1985). Gilbert’s (1991) sequential model of
negating describes how negations may be represented in
memory. In particular, the model suggests that all infor-
mation in memory is true as long as it is not “tagged” as
false. This tagging process is assumed to consume cog-
nitive resources. Empirical evidence consistent with
this assumption comes from a wide array of research.
For instance, Gilbert, Krull, and Malone (1990) asked
participants to learn a fictitious vocabulary by reading
translations (e.g., “a waihas is a fish”). In addition, par-
ticipants were immediately told that the translation was
either true or false; in some trials, participants were dis-
tracted as this information was conveyed. In those cases,
false translations were later more often remembered as
being true than true translations were remembered as
being false. In other words: If participants were dis-
tracted, negated information had similar effects as af-
firmed information. This phenomenon was replicated in
other experiments using a wide range of materials (e.g.,
Gilbert, Tafarodi, & Malone, 1993).
Because these studies typically assessed later judg-
ments or recollections, the results may be due to either
the actual encoding of negations or the later recall of
the information. In a series of experiments, Deutsch,
Gawronski, and Strack (2003) used priming measures
to assess more directly the actual processing of nega-
tions. In these experiments, the effects of evaluative
priming using affirmed versus negated words as primes
were compared to evaluative judgments of the same
stimuli, which were elicited under conditions that are
favorable for reflective processing. The results demon-
strated that under the priming conditions, effects of af-
firmed and negated stimuli were identical, whereas the
evaluative judgments were strongly affected by the ne-
gations. This implies that the inefficiency of a negation
cannot be reduced to characteristics of memory.
In addition, a study by Wegner, Ansfield, and Pilloff
(1998) showed that this dissociation applies not only to
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cognitive tasks but also to the self-regulation of behav-
ior. In that experiment, participants were asked to hold a
pendulum and try to prevent it from swinging. Not sur-
prising, they were better at holding the pendulum still if
they were not distracted by a secondary task. In a second
condition, however, the researchers specifically asked
participants to prevent the pendulum from swinging
along the x axis that was marked on a piece of paper.
Most surprising, in the distraction condition the pendu-
lumswungmorealong thexaxiswhenparticipantswere
explicitly instructed to prevent this from happening
compared to when they were given no such instructions.
If it is true that a depletion of cognitive resources in-
creases the likelihood that the impulsive system will
control behavior, the instruction not to perform a certain
behavior may have strengthened the link to a behavioral
schema that produces the undesired behavior.
Although under specific conditions, the reflec-
tive–impulsive model generates similar predictions as
Gilbert’s (1991) sequential model of negation, the two
models are not identical. Whereas Gilbert’s model fo-
cuses on the representation of negations in memory,
the reflective–impulsive model accounts for memory
and retrieval, as well as for the use of retrieved nega-
tions in judgmental tasks. Specifically, we assume that
during the encoding of a negation, a link between the
negated concept and the negating qualifier will be es-
tablished in the impulsive system. Moreover, we pro-
pose that the establishment of such a link in memory
and its use in judgments are two distinct processes. In
contrast, it is implied in Gilbert’s (1991) model that
when a false tag has been added to a piece of informa-
tion, it will be always correctly recognized as being
false. From the reflective–impulsive model it follows
that for participants who are low on cognitive re-
sources when they use a piece of information that had
been associated with a negating qualifier the effects of
negated information will be similar to those of af-
firmed information, despite the fact that the link to the
negation is available in memory. In addition, the fre-
quent rehearsal of a negation may strongly increase the
accessibility of the negated concept, as well as the ne-
gation itself. As a consequence, a feeling of familiarity
may arise when thinking of the negated concept; at the
same time, the label false may pop into one’s mind.
This may cause ambiguity, as the experiential cue di-
rectly opposes what is implied by the retrieved quali-
fier. Finally, the reflective–impulsive model predicts
that links between concepts and negating qualifiers
may develop either through reflective elaboration or
through frequent coactivation, which is independent of
reflection. Note again that a false tag is not sufficient
for the use of a negation in the course of social judg-
ments. These predictions from the reflective–impul-
sive model have yet to be tested.
In sum, the reflective–impulsive model can account
for known phenomena in the realm of negations and
generate new predictions that are open to empirical
testing. The main advantage of the reflective–impul-
sive model is that these predictions follow directly
from its general principles.
Representing the future. The second important
consequence relates to the ability to represent the fu-
ture. Because it is more independent from immediate
perceptual input, only the reflective system can explic-
itly generate a time perspective. Specifically, events
that are expected to occur in the future may be catego-
rized as such. This provides an important means of un-
derstanding courses of action and developments over
time. More important perhaps, it allows for the devel-
opment of strategies to pursue goals that are remote in
time. While the impulsive system is driven by immedi-
ate perceptual input, the reflective system is able to ab-
stract from the immediate input and bridge temporal
gaps. This allows individuals to resist immediate re-
wards and strive for more valuable future outcomes.
Empirical evidence supporting this notion comes
from a recent series of experiments by Deutsch and
Strack (2002). In particular, they established learning
conditions under which people were led to emit impul-
sive reactions that were opposed to their reflective
knowledge. Participants where asked to open red and
blue “doors to a photo gallery” on the computer screen.
Depending on the color of the door, their actions had
different consequences at different points in time. In
one condition, a particular color was immediately fol-
lowed by a photo of an extremely negative valence
from Lang’s collection (International Affective Picture
System, IAPS; Center for the Study of Emotion and
Attention, 1995), which was presented for 800 ms.
Four sec later, an extremely positive picture appeared
for another 4 sec. In the other condition, the valence of
the two photos was reversed.
Asked which photo gallery they would prefer, people
more frequently chose the contingency consisting of the
immediate but short exposure of the unpleasant and the
delayedbutmuch longerexposureof thepleasantphoto.
However, the delayed utility should not determine par-
ticipants’ reaction if a response has to be emitted under
conditions that prevent the reflective system from oper-
ating. This was the case when participants were in-
structed to open the doors under the conditions of the
stop paradigm (Logan, Schachar, & Tannock, 1997).
Thisprocedurehasbeenusedasabehavioralmeasureof
impulse strength, which is inferred from the ease with
which a response can be deliberately inhibited. As pre-
dicted by the reflective–impulsive model, impulse
strength was determined by the valence of the stimulus
that was immediately associated with the color of the
door; that is, if theshortbut immediatevalencewasposi-
tive, participants were less able to inhibit the elicited re-
sponse than if it was negative. In other words, the stimuli
acquired “hot” features (see Metcalfe & Mischel, 1999)
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through learning, which influenced behavioral im-
pulses and conflicted with the “cool” knowledge about
reward contingencies that vary over time.
Behavioral Control
A crucial component of the reflective–impulsive
model is its assumption that the reflective and impulsive
systems elicit behavior through different processes.
However, the execution of impulsively or reflectively
elicited behaviors is carried out by behavioral schemata
that are part of the impulsive system. We elaborate this
assumption by first discussing the development and op-
eration of behavioral schemata in the impulsive system.
Then, we describe how behavioral schemata can be acti-
vated through impulsive and reflective processes.
Final Common Pathway to Behavior
Thesis 5: Execution of behavior. There exists a
final common pathway to overt behavior in the
impulsive system that may be activated by input
from the reflective and the impulsive system.
This pathway consists of behavioral schemata of
varying abstractness. If the schema is activated
above a certain threshold, the behavior will be
executed.
In this model, elements in the impulsive system con-
sist of sensory, conceptual, affective, and motor repre-
sentations that can be interconnected (see section on
representationandprocessing).Typically, the following
three elements constitute a behavioral sequence: the sit-
uational condition, the behavior proper, and the conse-
quencesof thebehavior.Themodelassumes that similar
learning principles hold for all types of representations.
Thus, associative clusters will emerge in the impulsive
system that bind together frequently co-occurring mo-
tor representations with their conditions and their con-
sequences. These sensory-motor clusters are called be-
havioral schemata, and similar to other contents of the
impulsive system, they are subject to spreading activa-
tion and differ in their activation potential. In addition, if
one part of a behavioral schema is activated, the activa-
tion will spread to the remaining elements of the cluster.
Behavioral schemata and their links to other contents in
the impulsive system can be understood as habits (see
Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 2000; Ouelette & Wood, 1998).
In concordance with Norman and Shallice (1986),
we assume that impulsive and reflective processes can
lead to the activation of behavioral schemata, however
the two systems differ in how they activate a behavioral
schema. This is described in the following paragraph.
An important assumption is that more than one behav-
ioral schemata can receive activation at a time. How-
ever, activation must exceed a given threshold to result
in overt behavior.
Conflicts may arise if behavioral schemata are acti-
vated that are incompatible and inhibit one another. For
example, through mechanisms of the impulsive sys-
tem, the sight of food may activate an eating schema
while the reflective system is executing a decision to
stop eating. The resolution of the conflict depends on
the strength of the activation for each schema. If the
schemata are activated by the different systems, the
conditions that influence their operation determine
which schema will prevail. For example, the reflective
system will be more likely to control the behavior if the
necessary cognitive capacity is available. Conversely,
the impulsive system will be more likely to have the
upper hand under a strong deprivation of basic needs or
under a motivational orientation that facilitates the exe-
cution of the behavior. These possibilities will be dis-
cussed in a later section.
Precursors of Behavior
Thesis 6: Precursors of behavior. The systems
use different operations to elicit behavior. In the
reflective system, behavior is the consequence of
a decision that is guided by the assessment of a
future state in terms of its value and the probabil-
ity of attaining it through this behavior. In the im-
pulsive system, a behavior is elicited through the
spread of activation to behavioral schemata.
Impulsive precursors of behavior. As behav-
ioral schemata are part of the impulsive system, they
can be easily activated by impulsive processes. In par-
ticular, perceptual input may activate elements in the
impulsive system that are associated with behavioral
schemata or even a part of them. For example, seeing a
cup will activate a drinking schema. In addition, imagi-
native input as well as reflectively activated content of
the impulsive system may elicit associated behavioral
schemata. Thus, thinking about a cup is assumed to ac-
tivate a drinking schema.
Note that the impulsive precursors of behavior do
not imply knowledge about valence and expectancy.
Although not in the form of simple reflexes, perception
is linked to behavior in a direct fashion, as described by
the ideo-motor principle (James, 1890). James as-
sumed that “every representation of a movement awak-
ens in some degree the actual movement which is its
object” (p. 396). This is consistent with the assumption
that in the impulsive system, conceptual content and
behavioral schemata are bidirectionally linked. This
holds for either conceptual representations of anteced-
ents or consequences of a behavior, as well as for the
behavior itself. Research supporting the idea of a link
between conceptual and motor contents is reviewed
elsewhere (Dijksterhuis & Bargh, 2001)
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Reflective precursors. In the reflective system,
behavior is the result of reasoning that leads to a noetic
decision about the feasibility and desirability of a par-
ticular action (cf. Ajzen, 1991; Bandura, 1977). If the
execution of the behavior is deemed to be feasible and
its outcome positive, a behavioral decision will relate
the self to the behavioral outcome.
Although this reflective procedure seems to guaran-
tee a reasoned action as its behavioral consequence, the
previous thesis points to influences from the impulsive
system that are outside the deliberator’s attention. In
particular, the differential accessibility of information
about behavioral options or about relevant aspects of
the alternatives may direct reflective processing; that
is, although a procedure may be rational with respect to
the normative model, it is influenced by contents
whose accessibility is determined by factors unrelated
to rational considerations (e.g., Gregory, Cialdini, &
Carpenter, 1982).
However, a behavioral decision may not immedi-
ately elicit a goal-directed behavior. Instead, activation
may spread to several behavioral schemata and con-
cepts in the impulsive system. There may be at least
two reasons why the appropriate behavior may not be
executed immediately. First, other behavioral sche-
mata that are incompatible with the behavioral deci-
sion may be activated. This issue will be addressed in
the following. Second, the behavioral decision may re-
fer to a later point in time. This issue is addressed in the
section on intending.
Synergistic and Antagonistic
Interplay of Decisions and Impulses
Thus far, we have described how impulsive and re-
flective processes may jointly activate behavioral
schema that control overt behavior. The effect on be-
havior, however, depends on the compatibility of the
two forces. Specifically, if the reflective system and the
impulsive system contribute to an activation of the
same schema, the behavior is facilitated. Moreover, the
cognitive capacity required to control the execution
will be decreased and the execution of the behavior
may be accompanied by a feeling of fluency, which has
a positive hedonic quality (Winkielman & Cacioppo,
2001). Together with the positive evaluation of the out-
come, the cooperation of the two systems has enor-
mous motivational implications.
However, the two systems may also compete if they
activate incompatible schemata or if the reflective sys-
tem inhibits the execution of a behavior that is impul-
sivelyactivated.Suchantagonisticactivationmaybeac-
companied by a feeling of conflict and temptation. For
example, a person who is on a diet may be tempted to eat
a second dessert (see Figure 4); that is, the sight of the
dessert impulsively activates behavioral schemata that
are directed toward consumption. At the same time, the
reflective system has generated a behavioral decision to
refrain from eating it. To win the contest, the reflective
system can apply knowledge about the mechanisms of
the impulsive system. Most effectively, it may divert at-
tention from the tempting stimulus.
Finally, it is important to note that although both
systems may contribute to the execution of behavior,
the impulsive system can assume primary control if the
operating conditions (see Thesis 3) for the reflective
system are not fulfilled. As a result, behavior is less
likely to be determined by the assessed valence and the
probability of future consequences than by the imme-
diate associations and the resulting hedonic quality.
Intending
Thesis 7: Intending. In the reflective system, a be-
havioraldecision is linked tobehavioral schemata
by the process of intending. Intending monitors
the impulsive system for information that enables
the behavioral implementation of the decision.
The mechanism of intending is terminated if the
behavior is executed or if the goal of the preceding
behavioral decision is already fulfilled.
An important factor we must take into consideration
is that frequently an action cannot be executed at the
time the behavioral decision is made. In fact, the execu-
tion of many decisions depends on specific conditions
that are not yet fulfilled. Thus, there may be a gap be-
tween a behavioral decision and an action. If the execu-
tion of a reflectively chosen behavior depends on the ac-
tivation of behavioral schemata, constant activation
would be necessary to bridge possible temporal gaps.
However, such a permanent rehearsal of behavioral pro-
grams would absorb a great amount of cognitive capac-
ity and increase the risk that the behavior is executed be-
fore the appropriate conditions are fulfilled. This,
however, does not seem to be adaptive and may even be
detrimentalwithrespect to theproperpursuitof thegoal.
Therefore, we suggest a process of intending as it has
been discussed in modern theories of human motivation
(e.g., Gollwitzer, 1999). We assume that the temporal
gap between a behavioral decision and the execution of
an instrumental behavior is bridged by a process that au-
tomatically reactivates the behavioral decision and thus
activates behavioral schemata that are appropriate in the
situation. Moreover, we assume that the process of in-
tending is self-terminating; that is, when the goal of the
decision has been reached, the process is turned off.
We predict that intending also plays a role if a goal
is blocked. Because of the hierarchical organization of
goals, people may check the instrumentality of the ob-
structed goal vis-à-vis a superordinate objective and
choose a different means to the same end. Although the
appropriate evidence is still lacking, we expect that
other than through trial and error, the circumvention of
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obstacles requires the reflective system to establish al-
ternative means–ends relationships and initiate a new
operation of intending.
Motivation
So far, we have described the reflective system as a
highly flexible system when it comes to action, whereas
the impulsive system appears to be relatively rigid. Spe-
cifically, changing evaluations in the reflective system
may result in new decisions and their concomitant be-
havioral consequences. In contrast, the impulsive sys-
tem seems to be driven by the perceptual input as it is
connected to behavioral schemata. Changes of these
linksareassumed todevelopslowly following the lawof
effect, the law of readiness, and the law of practice
(Thorndike, 1911).
However, there are some ways in which the impul-
sive system can also react more flexibly, taking exter-
nal and internal conditions into account. For external
conditions, we propose that the impulsive system can
alternate between two distinct motivational orienta-
tions that guide the processing of information and the
activation of behavior. For internal conditions, we pro-
pose a specific way by which homoeostatic
dysregulations may influence impulsive processing.
Both motivational aspects are outlined in more detail in
the following sections.
Motivational Orientation
Thesis 8: Motivational orientation: The impul-
sive system can be oriented toward approach and
avoidance. This motivational orientation may be
elicited by
• the processing of positive or negative information,
• the perception of approach or avoidance,
• the experience of positive or negative affect,
• the execution of approach or avoidance behaviors.
In the impulsive system, processing of information
and the execution of behavior are mediated by two moti-
vational orientations (Cacioppo et al., 1993). In accor-
dancewithother theorists (e.g.,Gray,1982;Lang,1995;
Sutton & Davidson, 1997), we assume that these func-
tional orientations serve to prepare the organism for two
fundamental types of reactions toward the environment:
approach and avoidance. Approach orientation is a pre-
paredness to decrease the distance between the person
andanaspectof theenvironment.This includesphysical
locomotion, instrumental action, consumption, or the
imagination thereof. Avoidance orientation can be con-
ceptualized as a preparedness to increase the distance
between the person and the environment. This can be
achieved by either moving away from a target (flight) or
by causing the target to be removed (fight). The specific
typeof responsewithinbothmotivationalorientations is
determined by other influences.
Because evidence for the existence of approach and
avoidance systems is extensively reviewed elsewhere
(Gray, 1982; Lang, 1995), we focus here on the relation-
ship between affect, behavior, and information process-
ing within the two motivational orientations. The fol-
lowing thesis is grounded in the idea that processing of
positive information and the experience of positive af-
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Figure 4. Impulsive and reflective activation of competing behavioral schemata. While the perception of a dessert directly activates an
approach tendency, the noetic decision to lose weight leads to the behavioral decision to go for a walk instead of eating the dessert.
fect are most important for the regulation of approach
behavior, whereas the processing of negative informa-
tion and the experience of negative effect are most im-
portant for the regulation of avoidance behavior.
Thesis 9: Compatibility. The processing of infor-
mation, the experience of affect, and the execu-
tion of behavior are facilitated if they are compati-
ble with the prevailing motivational orientation.
The following propositions can be derived directly
from Thesis 9: If the impulsive system is oriented to-
ward approach, it facilitates the processing of positive
information, the experience of positive affect, and the
execution of approach behavior. In an avoidance mode,
it facilitates the processing of negative information, the
experience of negative affect, and the execution of
avoidance behavior. Moreover, Thesis 9 implies the
principle of bidirectionality, that is, a reverse causal in-
fluence (cf. Neumann, Förster, & Strack, 2003). Spe-
cifically, a motivational orientation may be elicited by
the valence of the processed information, the valence
of affect, or the orientation of a behavior (approach vs.
avoidance).
In the reflective system, a behavior may become the
basis for inferences about its underlying attitude (Bem,
1967). This, however, requires that the behavior is
propositionally categorized. That is to say, only if the
behavior is related to a category (e.g., forgetful) can it
enter into syllogistic inferences. In contrast, process-
ing in the impulsive system and the principle of
bidirectionality allow a behavior to influence process-
ing without being propositionally categorized; that is,
people are influenced by what they are doing even if
the meaning of an action is not recognized.
In the following discussion, we first review evi-
dence backing the idea that behavior may have a direct
effect on the processing of information that occurs in
the impulsive system and is therefore not mediated by
syllogistic inferences. At the same time, this evidence
serves as support for Thesis 9, which refers to compati-
bility as a basic principle of the impulsive system.
Then we focus on the reversed direction of influence
and review studies that illustrate the impact of
evaluative information on behavior. The principles of
motivational orientation are represented in Figure 5.
The Compatibility Principle I: The
Direct Impact of Behavior on
Mental Processes
Facial feedback. Self-perception theory (Bem,
1967) is among several applications that have been har-
nessed to explain a phenomenon in the domain of emo-
tional expression. Specifically, it has long been argued
(e.g., Darwin, 1872/1965) that facial (and other bodily)
expressions serve to not only communicate feelings to
others and thereby regulate social exchanges but also
to increase or diminish the intensity of an affective ex-
perience. Applied to the face, Darwin’s facial-feed-
back hypothesis has been studied from a self-percep-
tion perspective. Most prominently, Laird (e.g., 1974)
found that experimental participants who had been
asked to adopt a smiling expression gave a more posi-
tive judgment about themselves (e.g., their own
well-being) and about affective stimuli (e.g., cartoons)
that had been presented to them. According to self-per-
ception theory, participants inferred their affective
state from their facial expression. Such an inference,
however, requires that the behavior be interpreted as
the expression of a particular affective state; that is, a
person can only infer that she must be happy (or
amused) if she knows that she is smiling.
From the perspective of the reflective–impulsive
model, this is not the only way in which an overt be-
havior may influence mental processes. The inferences
described by self-perception theory operate according
to the principles of the reflective system; the impulsive
system, in contrast, allows for different mechanisms.
Specifically, it follows from Thesis 9 (compatibility)
that behavior may directly influence information pro-
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Figure 5. Principles of motivational orientation.
cessing. In detail, the behavioral schemata that activate
an emotional facial expression are assumed to be
linked with evaluatively compatible thought contents
and perhaps with affective experiences, and this facili-
tates the processing of the affective information.
This process may be mediated either through the
hedonic quality of the emotion or through the ap-
proach-versus-avoidance function of the behavior. In
the case of the induced smile, we assume that the im-
pulsive system facilitates the processing of positive in-
formation. As a consequence, cartoons will be rated as
funnier and people will feel more amused.
However, to demonstrate that a facial expression
may influence an emotional experience even if indi-
viduals do not draw an inference from the behavior, it
was necessary to prevent people from recognizing the
emotional meaning of their facial action. This was
achieved by embedding the contraction of the facial
muscle (in this case, the zygomaticus) in a task unre-
lated to an emotional expression. Specifically, under
the pretext of investigating how people who must do
so write or paint with their mouth, Strack, Martin,
and Stepper (1988) asked experimental participants to
hold a pen either between their teeth or between their
puckered lips while rating several cartoons inter-
spersed among other tasks. Thus, the teeth-holding
position activated the zygomaticus muscle, which is
used in smiling; the cover story prevented partici-
pants from interpreting their facial action as “a
smile.” Nevertheless, people assigned to this experi-
mental condition reported feeling more amused and
rated the cartoons as funnier than people who held
the pen with their puckered lips.
These findings (see also, Bodenhausen, Kramer, &
Suesser, 1994; Erber, 1991; Martin, Harlow, & Strack,
1992; Zajonc, Murphy, & Inglehart, 1989) show that
the effect of facial feedback does not depend on infer-
ences from the perceived emotional meaning of a facial
expression. Rather, facial feedback may also affect
mental processes in a more direct fashion, which can
be explained easily and parsimoniously by the mecha-
nisms that the reflective–impulsive model ascribes to
the impulsive system.
Postural feedback. Extending the same logic to
another medium of expressing emotions, Stepper and
Strack (1993) induced experimental participants to
adopt an upright or slumped posture under the pretext
of studying different working conditions. Based on
previous studies (Riskind, 1984), Stepper and Strack
expected that people would experience the emotion of
pride more intensely when adopting an upright body
position. Again, those earlier studies did not rule out
that people drew an inference from the quality of their
posture about the quality of their emotional state. In the
Stepper and Strack study, however, the posture was dis-
guised as an ergonomic investigation. Still, partici-
pants who were induced to believe they had scored
above average in a preceding task and were asked to
adopt an upright body posture while they received this
feedback reported feeling prouder than participants
who received the same information while adopting a
slumped posture. This result corroborates and extends
the previous facial-feedback findings (Strack et al.,
1988). It shows, in a different expressive dimension,
that the impact of posture on mental processes does not
hinge on inferences that are based on the perceived
meaning of the bodily action.
Head movements. Although these studies clearly
demonstrate the phenomenon, they are not explicit about
the exact mechanisms that afford such a direct influence
of a behavior on mental processes. Subsequent studies
were more informative. In particular, a series of experi-
ments in which we (Förster & Strack, 1996) explored the
effect of head movements on the recognition of words
sheds light on some underlying mechanisms. Participants
were asked to nod or shake their head while reading posi-
tive and negative words. To disguise the
communicational meaning of the head movements as an
act of agreement or disagreement, we had participants
“test headphones to be used while dancing” (Wells &
Petty, 1980). Specifically, participants were required to
perform either horizontal or vertical head movements
while the words were played on a cassette recorder.
As expected, we found that the head movements af-
fected performance in a surprise recognition task. In
particular, participants who had been induced to nod
were better at recognizing positive words, while partic-
ipants who had been induced to shake their head were
better at recognizing negative words. Moreover, this
proved not to be a response bias that affects the thresh-
old for words of a particular valence. Rather, the data
showed that when the head movement was compatible
with the valence of the word, people were better at dis-
criminating whether the word had been presented. This
suggests that the behavior influenced the processing of
the words at the time of the encoding.
This encoding hypothesis was tested more directly
in a second experiment, using a dual-task paradigm.
More specifically, while participants were explicitly
instructed to learn the words while nodding or shak-
ing their head, they were also required to perform a
manual dexterity task. If head movement facilitates
(or inhibits) the encoding of information, more (or
less) cognitive capacity will be left to perform the
secondary task. As a consequence, we predicted a
better manual dexterity performance if the learning of
positive words was accompanied by nodding, and the
learning of negative words by shaking one’s head.
Conversely, the outcome of the dexterity task should
be poorer if positive words are learned while shaking
one’s head, and negative words while nodding. The
results supported these predictions. Moreover, the in-
233
REFLECTIVE AND IMPULSIVE DETERMINANTS
clusion of neutral words showed that facilitation and
inhibition occurred as a function of valence-motor
compatibility or incompatibility.
These findings provide evidence for motor influ-
ences on mental processing when the behavior has no
immediate evaluative implications. However, these im-
plications are mediated by a motivational subsystem of
which the behavior is a part. In most cultures, nodding
is a nonverbal signal for agreement and shaking one’s
head for disagreement; these head movements are
therefore linked to an orientation toward approach or
avoidance that influences the way behavior is impul-
sively regulated. Tuning the impulsive system to an
orientation of approach facilitates the processing of
positive information and inhibits the processing of
negative information. Conversely, tuning the system
toward avoidance facilitates the processing of negative
information and inhibits the processing of positive in-
formation. Thus, head movements and the valence of
words are either compatible or incompatible and facili-
tate or inhibit the processing of information.
Approach and avoidance through isometric
muscle contractions. Similar effects were obtained
for a motor action that was previously found to influ-
ence positive and negative affect. In particular,
Cacioppo and his collaborators (e.g., Cacioppo et al.,
1993) discovered that pressing the palm of one’s hand
from the bottom against the surface of a table, thereby
activating the flexor muscle of the arm, led to positive
attitudinal judgments, while pressing from the top
against a table platform, thereby activating the
extensor muscle, led to negative attitudinal judgments.
Cacioppo et al. (1993) argued that through previous as-
sociations, flexor and extensor actions elicit a motiva-
tional orientation of approach versus avoidance.
The reflective–impulsive model integrates and ex-
tends Cacioppo et al.’s (1993) notion of a motivational
orientation that can be activated by any behavior com-
patible with approach or avoidance. It should therefore
be possible to apply the described influence of head
movements to reproduction memory (Förster & Strack,
1996) using the flexor-extensor paradigm. This was in
fact achieved by Förster and Strack (1997) for the repro-
duction of famous names; that is, contracting the flexor
muscle facilitated the recall of positively connotated
names, whereas contracting the extensor muscle im-
proved the recall of negatively connotated names.
The postulated principle of compatibility and
bidirectionality found additional support in a study by
Neumann and Strack (2000), who used a different de-
pendent variable. In particular, participants who were
presented words on a computer screen had to decide if
these words were positive or negative in valence. As
predicted by the reflective–impulsive model, we found
that positive words were categorized more rapidly
when participants had been induced to flex their arm,
whereas negative words were categorized more rapidly
when participants had to contract the extensor muscle.
Finally, Seibt and Neumann (2002) applied the
flexor/tensor procedure to the assessment of cartoons
and found that participants reported feeling more
amused if the flexor muscle was contracted than if the
tensor or no muscle was activated. Moreover, Seibt and
Neumann found that reported social anxiety (elicited
by the expectation of having to speak in front of a large
audience) was increased if participants had been in-
duced to contract the tensor muscle.
Direct activation of a motivational orientation.
In the reported studies, the link between a behavior and
the processing of evaluative information was assumed
to be strengthened through the prevailing motivational
orientation. To repeat, the impulsive system may be
oriented toward approach or avoidance (cf. also Lang,
1995), and this orientation may be triggered by the va-
lence of the processed information, by the experience
of compatible affect, and by the perception of move-
ments that imply approach or avoidance. An activated
motivational orientation results in the lowering of
thresholds for the processing of compatible informa-
tion (i.e., positive information for the approach and
negative information for the avoidance orientation),
and for the elicitation of compatible behaviors that
stand in a functional relationship with the orientation.
One way of activating a motivational orientation is to
put people in a situation in which the distance between
the person and an object appears to be increasing or de-
creasing; that is, if the distance is decreasing, the impul-
sive system should be oriented toward approach; if the
distance is increasing, the impulsive system should be
oriented towardavoidance.Asa result, theprocessingof
compatible information should be facilitated.
In a very direct test of this notion, Neumann and
Strack (2000) gave participants an evaluative decision
task in which the valence of positive and negative
words presented on a computer screen had to be cate-
gorized. More important, these words were presented
in the center of circles that were either increasing or de-
creasing in size. As documented in a manipulation
check, the changing size of the circles created the ap-
pearance that the words were moving either toward the
person or away from the person, although the actual
size of the letters remained constant. As predicted by
the reflective–impulsive model, this apparent change
in the distance between the target and the person influ-
enced the evaluative decision such that the valence of
positive words was categorized faster if the word ap-
peared to be moving toward the viewer, whereas the
valence of negative words was categorized faster if the
words appeared to be moving away.
To verify that this finding does not depend on the
evaluative nature of the task, we used the same para-
digm for a lexical decision task in which the stimulus
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material consisted of not only positive and negative
words but also neutral words and nonwords. Partici-
pants were asked to decide whether a letter string on
the screen was a word. Again, the response latencies
were as predicted: Lexical decisions for positive words
were faster if the letter strings appeared to be moving
toward the person, while lexical decisions for negative
words were faster if the letter strings appeared to be
moving away. This suggests that the predicted facilita-
tion effect is not a function of the evaluative nature of
the task but depends solely on the valence of the stimuli
(see also, Chen & Bargh, 1999).
The Compatibility Principle II: The
Impact of Evaluative Information
on the Execution of Behavior
On several occasions, we have emphasized
bidirectionality as a signature characteristic of the im-
pulsive system. This implies that a behavior may acti-
vate a motivational orientation, which then lowers the
threshold for the processing of compatible informa-
tion. However this also implies, conversely, that the va-
lence of information may exert a facilitating influence
on compatible behaviors that is mediated by the moti-
vational orientation. Concretely, it implies that the be-
haviors that served as independent variables in the ex-
periments described in the preceding paragraphs
should also operate as dependent variables. The avail-
able evidence supports this implication.
Facial action. As described in a previous sec-
tion, unobtrusively manipulated facial expressions
were found to influence evaluative judgments (Strack
et al., 1988). Conversely, we expected that facial ac-
tions would be facilitated if compatible information is
processed. This prediction was confirmed in a still un-
published set of experiments by Neumann and Hess
(2001), in which participants had to respond by con-
tracting their facial muscles. In particular, under the
pretext of studying whether responses to psychological
tasks emitted by body parts that are closer to the brain
differed from responses produced by more remote
body parts (such as the hand), participants had to con-
tract the corrugator or the zygomaticus muscle. Sur-
face electrodes recorded the EMG activity of both
muscles while participants assessed the valence of
words presented on a computer screen. As predicted,
the positivity of words was indicated faster with the
help of the zygomaticus (smiling) muscle, while the
negativity of words was assessed faster if participants
were using the corrugator (frowning) muscle. As in
previous studies, it was important to find out whether
the effect depended on the evaluative nature of the task,
or whether the evaluative nature of the stimulus influ-
enced the processing even for tasks with no evaluative
implications (see Neumann & Strack, 2000).
To that end, Neumann and Hess (2001) conducted a
second experiment in which participants had to merely
indicate when a stimulus appeared on a computer
screen. The stimuli were positive or negative words,
and the reactions had to be provided by either contract-
ing the corrugator or the zygomaticus. Again, the com-
patibility between the valence of the stimuli and the na-
ture of the motor action determined the response
latencies. Participants indicated the appearance of pos-
itive words faster when using the zygomaticus muscle,
and the appearance of negative words faster when us-
ing the corrugator muscle.
These findings provide clear evidence for the
bidirectionality postulated by the reflective–impulsive
model. In particular, it was shown that facial action pro-
videsnotonly feedback(Laird,1974)by influencing the
processing of evaluative information but also that its ex-
ecution is controlled by the valence of information.
Approach and avoidance through isotonic move-
ments. In previous studies that were based on a pro-
cedure by Cacioppo and associates (e.g., Cacioppo et
al., 1993), we were able to show that the processing of
positive versus negative information was facilitated de-
pending on whether the flexor or the extensor muscle
was contracted (Förster & Strack, 1997, 1998;
Neumann & Strack, 2000). This effect was expected
because the contractions are associated with move-
ments of approach and avoidance. The postulate of
bidirectionality predicts the opposite causal direction.
In particular, movements that are directed toward the
person should be facilitated if positive information is
processed, whereas movements away from the person
should be easier if the information is negative.
First evidence for this influence came from a study
by Solarz (1960), who presented cards with words that
were either positive or negative. Depending on the
words, participants had to either push these cards away
from themselves (avoidance) or pull them toward
themselves (approach). Solarz found that participants
were faster if the valence of the word and the move-
ment were compatible; that is, faster reactions were ob-
served if positive words had to be pulled toward the
person and negative words had to be pushed away.
This finding was replicated by Chen and Bargh
(1999), who had participants evaluate words on a com-
puter screen as good or bad by either pushing or pulling
a lever. In line with Solarz’ (1960) findings, lower re-
sponse latencies were obtained if the valence of posi-
tive words had to be indicated by pulling the lever or
the valence of negative words by pushing the lever. In a
second study, Chen and Bargh (1999) showed that this
compatibility effect did not depend on the evaluative
nature of the task. Rather, it was also obtained if the
task was simply to indicate whether a word (that was
either positive or negative) appeared on the screen.
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Head movements. Vertical or horizontal move-
ments of one’s head influence the encoding of negative
or positive information (Förster & Strack, 1996). The
reverse, however, is also the case. Wells and Petty
(1980) found that people nodded their head more often
if they agreed with the content of an attitudinal mes-
sages they heard through headphones. Similarly,
Förster and Strack (1996) observed that when partici-
pants had to nod while encoding the words, positive
words increased the rate of nodding. Conversely, if
people had to shake their head, negative words in-
creased the rate of shaking.
Affect as a determinant of motivational orienta-
tion. The distinction between two motivational ori-
entations is closely related to a model proposed by
Lang and his associates (for a review, see Lang,
Bradley, & Cuthbert, 1990), who postulated appetitive
and aversive motivational systems that facilitate be-
havioral responses. Based on biological and
neuropsychological evidence, these researchers as-
sume that “associations, representations, and action
programs that are linked to the engaged motivational
system have a higher probability of success” (Lang,
1995, p. 377). Moreover, these motivational systems
are activated by an organism’s emotional or affective
state. An extensive program of research with animals
and humans found that startle responses were in-
creased when negative affect had been elicited. This
was particularly the case for the emotion of fear. At the
same time, the startle response was found to be inhib-
ited if the organism was in the state of positive affect.
These findings support the reflective–impulsive
model in its assumption of a motivational orientation
that links mental and behavioral processes. At the same
time, the dynamics of the impulsive system and the
role of the motivational orientation go beyond the
mechanisms identified by Lang and his associates
(e.g., Lang, 1995). For example, the reflective–impul-
sive model treats behavior as a dependent and an inde-
pendent variable. As previously described, a particular
behavior may elicit a motivational orientation, which
may then facilitate the processing of compatible infor-
mation. In the reflective–impulsive model, the motiva-
tional orientation functions by selectively lowering the
threshold for the processing of evaluatively compatible
information and for the execution of functionally com-
patible behaviors. At the same time, the motivational
systems theory provides important links to underlying
biological substrates, particularly the role of the
amygdala.
Homoeostatic Dysregulation
Thesis 10: Homoeostatic Dysregulation. Depri-
vation of basic needs will lead to an activation of
those behavioral schemata that in the past fre-
quently led to satisfaction of those needs.
Motivational orientations only moderate the execu-
tionofbehaviorand theprocessingof informationbased
on valence. Although this is true for a wide range of be-
haviors, somesituationsmaycall foramorespecificdis-
position to act. In particular, if basic needs are not satis-
fied, specific behaviors are necessary to remedy this
state of deficiency. To account for the influence of basic
needs within the reflective–impulsive model, we invoke
a mechanism resembling the notions proposed in early
drive theory (Hull, 1943). In particular, we propose that
whenever a state of deprivation is successfully abol-
ished, behaviors and situational circumstances that led
to satisfying the need become strongly linked to the ex-
perience of this deprivation (cf. Dickinson & Balleine,
2002). Consequently, if the same need is deprived again,
the behavioral schemata and conceptual contents that
were previously related to the satisfaction will again be
activated and produce a behavioral preparedness and a
perceptual readiness for the processing of relevant in-
formation in the environment (Bruner, 1957). For exam-
ple, the deprivation of food will facilitate behavioral
schemata of food intake and spread activation to con-
ceptual representations of food. As a result, stimuli that
are related to food should be recognized more easily un-
der conditions of food deprivation.
ThiswasfoundinanexperimentconductedbyWispe
and Drambarean (1953), who asked participants to rec-
ognize words that were presented very briefly on the
computer screen. Some of their participants had not
eaten for 10 or 24 hours, whereas others had had a snack
just prior to the experiment. Moreover, the words were
either food related or not. As expected, hungry partici-
pants were faster at detecting food-related words than
neutral words. However, no such difference was ob-
served in participants who were not hungry. Similar re-
sults were recently obtained by Aarts, Dijksterhuis, and
De Vries (2001) for thirst and drinking-related words.
Support for our notion that people’s attention toward
stimuli that are capable of reducing the deprivation is in-
creased by the behavioral schemata is provided by a
study by Lavy and van den Hout (1993). Based on fast-
ing participants’ ratings of food valence and urge to eat,
LavyandvandenHoutconcluded thatattentionalbias in
a Stroop task was more likely to come from an increased
urge to act than from deprived people’s emotional expe-
rience. The increased accessibility of need-relevant
concepts may also guide the interpretation of ambigu-
ous stimuli. For example, D. C. McClelland and
Atkinson (1948) demonstrated that hungry participants
were more likely than satiated participants to identify
ambiguous stimuli as food-related objects.
Homoeostatic dysregulations may also modulate
evaluative responses. As Lewin (1935) noted, the va-
lence of an object “usually derives from the fact that
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the object is a means to the satisfaction of a need” (p.
78). Existing evidence shows that need-related objects
are experienced to be more positive under deprivation
(e.g., Drobes et al., 2001; Lavy & van den Hout, 1993).
Moreover, it has been demonstrated that need-irrele-
vant objects are devaluated (Brendl, Markman, &
Messner, 2003). That such shifts of valence occur im-
pulsively was recently demonstrated by Seibt, Häfner,
and Deutsch (2003) who found in two experiments that
evaluative associations related to food as well as spon-
taneous orientations toward approach versus avoid-
ance depended on food deprivation.
It is important to note that the link between depriva-
tion and the facilitation of behavioral schemata and the
activation of conceptual contents is believed to develop
only for needs that are immediately experienced. Other
dysregulations (such as that of blood pressure) are not
experienced. Thus, the described behavioral and con-
ceptual mechanisms will not be elicited.
Affect and Emotion
Affect and emotion are understood as products of the
reflective and the impulsive system. Following Rus-
sell’s (2003) theory of emotion, our model implies that
the impulsive system generates a simply structured state
of core affect that, by reflective processes, can be trans-
formed in more elaborate feelings and emotions. In par-
ticular, we assume that a person’s core affect is a state
that can be experienced on the dimensions of hedonic
quality and arousal. Thus, a person may feel good or feel
bad in a way that is accompanied by high or low activa-
tion. Because the origin of this state is not part of the ex-
perience, situationally and chronically accessible con-
tents may be reflectively assigned as causes.
As a consequence, a noetic awareness emerges
along with the experienced affect. For example, people
may feel good (or bad) about themselves. At the same
time, they may engage in behaviors that are directed by
the valence of the affective quality and fueled by the
state of activation. Based on emotional schemata, the
particular configuration of experience and knowledge
may then be categorized as a particular emotion. Then,
a person may, for example, feel proud about a particu-
lar achievement (e.g., Neumann, Seibt, & Strack,
2001) or disappointed at a friend’s betrayal.
Thus, the reflective–impulsive model does not claim
that specific emotions produce specific behaviors.
Rather, it maintains that behavioral schemata are impul-
sively influenced by habit strength, motivational orien-
tation and homeostatic dysregulation. In addition, re-
flective considerations may enter into the equation. For
example, we do not assume that fighting is a necessary
behavioral consequence of anger whereas fleeing is a
necessary result of fear. Instead, and in agreement with
Russell’s (2003) model, we propose that the evaluative
quality of the information orients the system toward in-
creasing the distance (i.e., avoidance). Whether this is
accomplished by moving away from the target (i.e.,
flight) or by causing the target to be removed (i.e., fight)
depends on determinants in the situation and in the per-
son (e.g., Keltner, Grunfeld, & Anderson, 2003), or the
level of activation. The experienced emotions of fear or
anger are the categories that are used to represent the en-
tire emotional episode in the reflective system.
From this conceptualization it follows that affect
may influence behavior in at least two ways. First, core
affect possesses a motivational orientation toward ap-
proach and avoidance that facilitates concomitant be-
haviors. Second, affective experiences may be proposi-
tionally categorized and become the basis of syllogistic
inferences that may lead to noetic and behavioral deci-
sions. Both possibilities are discussed in this article. For
a more detailed integration of affect and emotion into
dual-systemnotions, seeSmithandNeumann(inpress).
Automaticity
During the past 15 years, automaticity has become
an increasingly important topic in social psychology
(e.g., Bargh, 1990; Bargh & Ferguson, 2000). Even
such complex social-cognitive processes as goal acti-
vation (e.g., Bargh & Barndollar, 1996), trait infer-
ences (e.g., Gilbert, 1989), or the imitation of social be-
havior (e.g., Dijksterhuis, Bargh, & Miedema, 2000)
have been shown to operate outside consciousness,
without intention, to be hard to control as well as
highly efficient (cf. Bargh, 1996). It is a widely held as-
sumption that automaticity of cognitive procedures is
achieved through frequent execution (e.g., Anderson,
1981). As Bargh (1997) put it: “Any skill, be it percep-
tual, motor, or cognitive, requires less and less con-
scious attention the more frequently and consistently it
is engaged” (p. 28).
How can automaticity be understood from the van-
tagepointof the reflective–impulsivemodel?Ofcourse,
it is the impulsive system to which the central criteria of
automaticity (seeBargh,1997)apply.Particularly its in-
dependence from intention and its high efficiency fol-
low from its architecture as an associative network. In
contrast, the reflective system is assumed to depend
heavily on cognitive resources and to generate inten-
tions throughbehavioraldecisions.However, according
to the reflective–impulsive model, the quality of the im-
pulsive mechanisms differs from that of reflective pro-
cesses, which is why a direct transposition of reflective
procedures to the impulsive system is not possible.
This raises the question of how controlled processes
can become more automatic? The reflective–impulsive
model implies several mechanisms that play a role (cf.
Smith, 1994; Smith, Branscombe, & Borman, 1988).
The first and most simple mechanism is that contents
from the associative store of the impulsive system are
used and thus activated during reflective processing. If
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information is transformed through a syllogistic proce-
dure (e.g., to infer the valence of a negated word), the
input to the procedure (e.g., the negated word) as well
as its output (e.g., the resultant valence) will be acti-
vated in the impulsive system. If this is repeated fre-
quently, the joint activation of input and output will es-
tablish an associative link between the two contents.
Thus, the results of previous syllogistic procedures are
stored in memory and eventually can be retrieved in an
automatic fashion (cf. Logan, 1988).
This memory-based mechanism predicts only a nar-
row transfer of automatic responses to new instances or
situations. In particular, only the reaction to those or
similar (cf. Palmeri, 1997) instances that were prac-
ticed can be elicited in an automatic fashion. However,
the reflective–impulsive model can also account for
more general effects of practice (see also, Anderson,
1993). First, the operational principles of the reflec-
tive–impulsive model imply that the frequent execu-
tion of reflective procedures makes the representation
of these procedures more accessible for further use.
Second, representations of procedures may become as-
sociated with situations in which they were frequently
carried out. Finally, syllogistic procedures may be-
come associated with other procedures if they are fre-
quently carried out in temporal proximity. Conse-
quently, complex syllogistic operations may become
more efficient through practice, because the more spe-
cific procedures they consist of can be quickly re-
trieved from memory.
These assumptions set limits for automatic process-
ing under specifiable circumstances. An example is the
well-practiced cognitive operation of negating. Evi-
dence (Deutsch et al., 2003) suggests that through the
frequent execution of this operation, semantic links
will be created that facilitate further processing. For
example, the term no way has acquired its own mean-
ing whereas the term no hay needs further reflective
processing to be understood, independent of the fre-
quency with which the former negation is used. It is
therefore the particular content that profits from fre-
quent practice, but not the generalized application of
the rule. In this model, the frequent execution of reflec-
tive mechanisms may form associations and allows the
impulsive system to “take over.” However, this does
not mean that the reflective procedure of negating will
be performed automatically; rather, it will be substi-
tuted by a different mechanism that fulfills the criteria
of automaticity.
Although the idea that thesamepsychologicalproce-
durecanbe transposedfromoneoperationalmode toan-
other has a venerable history in psychology and goes
back toHelmholtz’s (1867)notionofunconscious infer-
ences, we second Lieberman et al. (2002) in that the idea
of automatic processes as merely faster and quieter ver-
sions of controlled processes “is theoretically parsimo-
nious, intuitively compelling, and wrong” (p. 205).
Application to Phenomena in Social
Psychology
In the remainder of this article, we discuss the im-
plications of the reflective–impulsive model (see Fig-
ure 6 for the full model) for various aspects of social
psychology and illuminate its potential for explaining
different phenomena of social behavior. Special em-
phasis is given to predictions where this model will go
beyond or differ from existing dual-process models.
Implicitness and Explicitness in
Attitudes, Prejudice, and Stereotyping
In the past decade, research in social psychology has
increasingly focused on so-called implicit phenomena
(e.g., Farnham, Greenwald, & Banaji, 1999). In particu-
lar, central concepts such as stereotypes, prejudice, atti-
tudes, or goals were assumed to operate not only as con-
tents of consciousness but also outside of conscious
awareness (e.g., Banaji, 2001; Blair, 2001). To study
such implicit phenomena, new methods of research
have been developed (e.g., Maass, Castelli, & Arcuri,
2000), such as the implicit association test (Greenwald,
McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998), evaluative priming
(Fazio, Sanbonmatsu, Powell, & Kardes, 1986), or af-
fective variants of the Stroop and Simon task (e.g., De
Houwer, Crombez, & Baeyens, 2001). These measures
have in common that they do not rely on conscious eval-
uations of the attitude object itself, thereby circumvent-
ing correctional processes because of social desirability
or other reasons. Instead, they tap into mechanisms that
are automatically instigated by the attitude object.
There is no doubt that the reflective–impulsive
model bears a family resemblance to explicit–implicit
models in that both notions hold that different mecha-
nisms may mediate between valence and behavior.
However, there are several issues on which the reflec-
tive–impulsive model takes a divergent position. First,
we suggest that the two systems operate in parallel and
interact with one another. In contrast, most ex-
plicit–implicit models assume a sequential mode of
operation (see Smith & DeCoster, 2000). Second, the
partition of the reflective–impulsive model into two
systems is not based on the presence or absence of con-
scious awareness (e.g., Greenwald & Banaji, 1995).
We refrain from using the phenomenal experience that
may accompany mental processes as a distinctive crite-
rion because we do not know precisely how conscious-
ness arises from psychological or neural processes. In
particular, consciousness is often seen as an
epiphenomenon rather than a causal force or even an
integral part of cognition (Libet, Gleason, Wright, &
Pearl, 1983; Wegner, 2002). Moreover, categorizing a
process as conscious or unconscious provides little in-
formation about its computational nature. Therefore,
the reflective–impulsive model does not invoke the ex-
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istence of implicit attitudes, implicit stereotypes, im-
plicit goals, or implicit self-esteem.
Some theorists in the field of implicit social cogni-
tion have begun to elaborate on more unique features
of implicit phenomena. For instance, Wilson et al.
(2000) advanced the thesis that implicit attitudes may
change more slowly than explicit ones and tend to in-
fluence expressive and automatic behaviors. Green-
wald et al. (2002) specified implicit associative mecha-
nisms that incorporate principles of cognitive balance.
We would like to go one step further and propose to
ground the implicit–explicit distinction primarily on
operational characteristics. In line with other dual-pro-
cess models (e.g., Smith & DeCoster, 2000), we locate
implicit processes in the impulsive system, whereas
explicit processes are thought to take place in the re-
flective system. Specifically, we prefer to use the terms
explicit versus implicit for psychological processes but
not for mental contents. As a consequence, an attitude
is defined as a belief following from an evaluative deci-
sion that follows from reflection about what is good or
bad. At the same time, we talk about evaluative associ-
ations to describe links between concepts and
evaluative responses in the impulsive system. In a simi-
lar vein, stereotypic associations are distinguished
from stereotypic beliefs (Devine, 1989).
This conceptualization affects the interpretation of
implicit measures. Despite their popularity, the psy-
chological status of what they assess is still unclear (for
a review, see Fazio & Olson, 2003). Some theorists ar-
gue that implicit measures identify implicit attitudes or
implicit stereotypes (e.g., Wilson et al., 2000); others
prefer to view the measure itself as implicit, but not the
attitude (or whatever other concept; Fazio & Olson,
2003). From the perspective of the reflective–impul-
sive model, explicit and implicit measures are defined
by the cognitive operations that they capture. In this
sense, explicit measures tap into people’s knowledge
or beliefs, implicit measures tap into their associative
structures.
Beyond redefining the implicit versus explicit di-
chotomy, the reflective–impulsive model may help to
understand how behaviors may be influenced by ex-
plicit and implicit mechanisms. Although it has been
proposed that the implicit and explicit phenomena may
take different routes to behavior (e.g., Dovidio,
Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997; Wil-
son et al., 2000), most models are relatively mute on the
cognitive or motivational structures underlying such in-
fluences. The reflective–impulsive model can account
for such influences through its inherent interconnec-
tions between conceptual and behavioral representa-
tions as well as through its motivational orientations.
Automatic Attitude Activation
Many studies (see Fazio, 2001) have demonstrated
that attitudes may be activated very quickly, efficiently,
unintentionally, or even unconsciously on the percep-
tion of the attitude object. In his influential motivation
and opportunity as determinants model (MODE
model), Fazio (1990) specified the circumstances un-
der which attitudes may automatically influence be-
havior. In particular, Fazio assumed that only strongly
associated attitudes will exert automatic influences.
The main process through which attitudes may influ-
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Figure 6. Overview of the complete reflective–impulsive model.
ence behavior spontaneously is by influencing the per-
ception of the situation. If motivation and cognitive re-
sources are high, however, more deliberate
considerations and effortful search in memory may
prevail and determine the perception of the situation
and finally the behavior.
Although the mechanisms of the reflective–impul-
sive model are consistent with the tenet that motivation
and opportunity (for thorough processing) are precon-
ditions for reflective choice, the model proposes a
somewhat different mechanism for nondeliberative
processing. Both models assume that objects can be as-
sociated with a positive or negative valence. The
MODE model suggests that the activation of such posi-
tive and negative associations may tune the perception
of the situation, which then influences behavior in a
spontaneous fashion. Although the reflective–impul-
sive model includes this mechanism as a possibility, it
also affords an alternative option that does not require
the operation of the reflective system. Specifically, the
reflective–impulsive model proposes that a behavior
may be influenced by its facilitation through a motiva-
tional orientation that is activated by the valence of the
processed contents (see Thesis 9). Finally, the impul-
sive system provides for the possibility that perception
is directly linked to behavioral schemata, allowing for
an even more direct path to behavior than the MODE
model (see Thesis 5).
Thus, from the perspective of the reflective–impul-
sive model, the behavioral component of an attitude
has a reflective and an impulsive meaning: reflective in
that it refers to a behavioral decision that is derived
from an evaluation, and impulsive in that it refers to ac-
tion tendencies that are directly associated with the
evaluative features of the attitude object.
Intuitive and Heuristic Judgments
As mentioned earlier, theorizing in social psychol-
ogy has been enriched by dual-process models that dis-
tinguish between rule-based and associative process-
ing (Smith & DeCoster, 2000). At the same time, it has
been recognized that judgments may be generated in
ways that differ in the ease with which they can be per-
formed. In particular, it has been argued that judges
may use mental shortcuts to save time and effort. Most
prominent, Tversky and Kahneman (1974) identified a
set of judgmental heuristics that serve this purpose.
Some dual-process theorists (e.g., Eagly & Chaiken,
1993) have combined the two research programs and
proposed that heuristic and nonheuristic judgments are
generated by qualitatively distinct processes (for an al-
ternative view, see Kruglanski & Thompson, 1999;
Strack, 1999). First, there is a systematic mode in
which judgments are formed following rational or logi-
cal principles of the rule-based type of processing. Sec-
ond, there is an intuitive or heuristic mode in which
judgments are generated in ways that are based on vari-
ous simplified associative procedures that afford
decisions under suboptimal conditions.
At first glance, the reflective–impulsive model may
seem to mirror this distinction. This, however, is not
the case, because there are no reflective versus impul-
sive ways to social judgments that people can choose
as alternatives. Rather, we assume that judgments and
decisions are exclusively made by the reflective sys-
tem, whereas the impulsive system operates in parallel
(see Thesis 3). How then can the reflective–impulsive
model account for intuitive or heuristic judgments?
The answer rests on a more detailed analysis of
what we mean by judgments that are not generated in a
systematic fashion. In general, there seems to be agree-
ment that they consist of shortcuts to circumvent
effortful and time-consuming systematic processing.
From the perspective of our model, there are three
types of shortcuts driven by noetic, experiential, or be-
havioral processes.
Noetic shortcuts are conceived as simplifying infer-
ences based on characteristics of the target. One exam-
ple is the belief that a long, persuasive message is more
valid than a short message (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993).
Thus, the general principle length implies strength is
used as a premise in an inference (see Kruglanski &
Thompson, 1999) that allows a person to make a deci-
sion without tediously scrutinizing each argument. In a
related fashion, the rule of similarity implies category
membership may simplify propositional categoriza-
tions that would otherwise require complex computa-
tions using base-rate probabilities (see Tversky &
Kahneman, 1982).
At the same time, there are experiential shortcuts,
which are conceived of as simplifying inferences based
on subjective experiences. For example, the mental ef-
fort that is experienced while trying to generate a judg-
ment may become the basis for an inference about the
target. The probability of an event’s occurrence
(Tversky & Kahneman, 1973) and the fame of a person
(Jacoby, Kelley, Brown, & Jasechko, 1989; see also
Strack & Neumann, 2000) seem to be determined by
the experienced mental effort. Similarly, affective ex-
periences (such as current mood) may become the ba-
sis for inferences about one’s own global well-being
(Schwarz & Clore, 1983) or for judgments about con-
sumer goods (Wänke, Bohner, & Jurkowitsch, 1997).
Noetic and experiential components are combined in
a third shortcut that immediately follows from a mecha-
nism described by the reflective–impulsive model: A
judgment may be based on a behavioral tendency or a
motivational orientation that is produced by the impul-
sive system. Extending the logic of self-perception the-
ory (Bem, 1967), the noetic and experiential representa-
tion of one’s behavioral tendencies may enter the
reflective system before they are actually carried out.
Thus, a person noting that he or she is driven to approach
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a given target may translate this experience into knowl-
edge and use it for inferences about the target.
According to the model we present, the impulsive
system plays a passive role in heuristic and intuitive
judgments. In particular, its operation may provide an
experiential awareness and the associative contents to
which mental shortcuts are applied. However, the ap-
plication of these simplifying rules of reasoning takes
place in the reflective system. This is indicated particu-
larly by the fact that judges may correct for a lack of
representativeness in the noetic or experiential basis of
the judgment. The correctional mechanism in situa-
tions where affect is used as information has been re-
peatedly demonstrated and discussed by Schwarz and
Clore (e.g., 1996; for a more general perspective, see
Strack, 1992; Strack & Hannover, 1996).
Thus, although it may seem tempting to connect
nonsystematic judgments to specialized intuitive or
heuristic processes, the explanation provided by the re-
flective–impulsive model is quite different. In particu-
lar, the model suggests that although judgments and de-
cisions are made in the reflective system, it is important
to understand its interactions with the impulsive system.
This is particularly obvious in the case of experiential
shortcutswhereonemustaskunderwhatconditionsand
at what points in the judgmental sequence subjective ex-
perience may enter into the reflective system.
Regulatory Focus
One of the most influential theories in recent moti-
vational science is regulatory focus theory (RFT; Hig-
gins, 1997), which predicts how strategies of approach
and avoidance result from positive and negative events
that are experiences or expected. This topic has been
under research for a long time, and RFT is in line with
the conventional view or hedonic principle (e.g., Gray,
1982; Lang, 1995) in that considering the presence of a
positive valence as an outcome (gain) elicits a type of
approach orientation that is described as promotion fo-
cus, whereas considering the presence of a negative va-
lence as an outcome (loss) elicits an avoidance orienta-
tion or a prevention focus. However, RFT goes beyond
the hedonic principle when it comes to motivational ef-
fects of considering nongains and nonlosses as out-
comes. According to RFT, deliberating about nongains
as possible outcomes of one’s action is connected to a
promotion focus and should therefore elicit an ap-
proach-type orientation, although its overall valence is
negative. Similarly, deliberating about nonlosses as
possible outcomes is assumed to instigate a prevention
focus and therefore avoidance-type behaviors, despite
its overall valence is positive.
Applying the reflective–impulsive model to this
topic leads to a more differentiated prediction. In par-
ticular, different motivational orientations are assumed
to depend on whether operations are carried out in the
impulsive or in the reflective system. As was outlined
before, we believe that the impulsive system adheres to
the hedonic principle (i.e., positive stimulation facili-
tates approach, negative stimulation facilitates avoid-
ance), and that it is incapable of extracting the meaning
of negations. Consequently, the impulsive system can-
not represent nongains or nonlosses in terms of propo-
sitions, but only as associations. In particular, a person
may experience a situation in which frequent rewards
are delivered. For instance, a very talented student may
be frequently praised by all teachers. At the same time,
some external cues may signal the omission of reward,
that is nongain. For instance, the student may learn that
she is frequently rewarded, except when she is in math
class, because her math teacher does not like her and
praises everyone but her. In this situation, the opera-
tional principles of the impulsive system predict that
the math teacher will become associated with frustra-
tion (cf. Higgins, Shah, & Friedman, 1997) and will
serve as a signal of negative stimulation that is, in turn,
expected to instigate an avoidance orientation. Analo-
gously, signals of nonpunishment are predicted to be-
come associatively linked to positive affect and thus an
approach orientation.
If information about nongains and nonlosses is con-
veyed verbally, however, a different pattern is pre-
dicted to occur. In this case, the valence of the event
must be inferred reflectively from negated statements,
whereas in the case of conditioning, the valence is al-
ready stored in memory. At the same time, because
contents of reflective operations are assumed to be re-
trieved from the impulsive system, the negated con-
cepts will receive activation, thereby instigating a con-
gruent motivational orientation. Take the situation of a
student, hearing the sentence “if you do not succeed at
the test you’ll not get good grades.” Within the impul-
sive system, hearing this sentence is assumed to acti-
vate the concepts success and good, as well as not,
which are of predominantly positive valence. Thus,
perceiving verbal descriptions of potential nongains
will instigate an approach orientation. Similarly, per-
ceiving verbal descriptions of potential nonlosses will
instigate an avoidance orientation.
In sum, the reflective–impulsive model predicts that
informationaboutnongainsandnonlosseshasopposing
effects depending on whether it is conveyed through
discriminative stimuli that have acquired their meaning
through associative learning or in a verbal format con-
taining negations. Whereas in the former case, nongains
are assumed to elicit an avoidance motivation because
they cue frustration and hence negative affect, in the lat-
ter case an approach orientation is predicted because
positive concepts will be activated in memory. Up to
now, this prediction has not been tested in an adequate
experimental setting. However, some evidence, sam-
pled across experiments and species, can be regarded as
first evidence for the viability of this prediction.
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Specifically, in many of the experiments supporting
RFT, action-outcome expectations were conveyed ver-
bally, whereas in animal research on operant and Pav-
lovian conditioning (see Rescorla & Solomon, 1967),
cues for nonreward and nonpunishment acquired their
meaning through associative learning. It is significant
that human and animal experimentation differs in its re-
sults.Studieswithhumanparticipantsmatchourpredic-
tions for the case when information is conveyed ver-
bally. For example, some participants in one experiment
by Crowe and Higgins (1997) were instructed that they
would not have to perform a disliked task if they do not
dopoorlyon theexercises (prevention focus),whileoth-
erswhere instructed that theywouldhave todoadisliked
task if they do not do well on the exercises (promotion
focus).4 In several cognitive tasks, participants in the
prevention focus were found to be more cautious and
slow, and thus more accurate than participants in a pro-
motion focus (e.g., Förster, Higgins, & Idson, 1998;
Idson, Liberman, & Higgins, 2000; Shah, Higgins, &
Friedman, 1998). In contrast, results from animal stud-
ies match our predictions for associatively learned cues.
In one experiment (Ray & Stein, 1959), rats learned that
a high tone was associated with the receiving an electric
shock, whereas a low tone was associated with the omis-
sionofsuchashock. Inasecondpart, theanimalshad the
opportunity to press a bar for the delivery of milk. This
type of approach behavior was suppressed if the signal
for punishment (the high tone) was presented simulta-
neously.More interesting, thesignal fornonpunishment
(low tone) facilitated the approach behavior above base-
line responding. Other research reviewed by Rescorla
andSolomon(1967)aswellasbyKlein (1996) indicates
that conditioned signals for nonreward facilitate avoid-
ance behavior and that signals for nonpunishment in-
hibit avoidance behavior.
In sum, the reflective–impulsive model accounts for
phenomena of regulatory focus as a joint effect of re-
flective and impulsive mechanisms. The dissociation
of the effects of indirect verbal versus direct condi-
tioned activation of nongain and nonloss expectancies
can then be understood as the consequence of different
properties of the impulsive system and the reflective
system. This interpretation, however, relies on results
that were obtained across studies and species. Future
research should generate experimental procedures that
allow the orthogonal activation of direct versus indirect
of expectancies in human participants.
Conclusion
In this article, we have advanced the position that
behavior is determined not only by assessments of
probability and value. This means that social behavior
is not exclusively determined by people’s attitudes.
Rather, it is important to consider impulsive influences
and study their interaction with the components of re-
flective determination. This framework integrates con-
cepts from motivational science into a dual-system the-
ory and is able to explain a wide range of phenomena
such as habitual versus intentional behavior, spontane-
ous approach and avoidance behavior, perception-be-
havior links, and effects of deprivation. Beyond this in-
tegrative attempt, the reflective–impulsive model may
contribute more than the sum of its parts in that phe-
nomena, that are unexplained assumptions in other
models, follow logically from this framework and from
its operating characteristics. This includes phenomena
as diverse as the processing of negations, the limits of
automatic social cognition, or the mechanisms of regu-
latory focus.
More important, the proposed perspective may help
recover some phenomena that are considered to be the
precursors of social psychology, specifically, the psy-
chology of mass behavior (Le Bon, 1895; see also
Freud, 1921/1922; McDougall, 1920). Despite the in-
sights that have been gained by replacing the mass by
the group, social psychologists are ill at ease when it
comes to explaining social behaviors that are not
guided by people’s attitudes, such as panic behaviors,
vandalism, riots, uprisings, and many facets of aggres-
sion and violence. Unlike Le Bon, we do not have to in-
voke an irrational and emotional group mind that is
susceptible to hypnotic suggestion. Instead, our under-
standing of the mechanism of impulsive actions and of
the conditions under which they occur will provide us
with a more complete picture of social behavior.
Another advantage of the reflective–impulsive
model is that it lends itself to approaches from neuro-
science (see also, Lieberman et al., 2002). Although it
seems difficult to link the reflective system and the im-
pulsive system as a whole to specific brain structures,
this may well be possible for specific psychological
processes described in the model. Take for instance im-
pulsively aggressive behavior that is due to reflective
underregulation. Neuroscientists have convincingly ar-
gued that such underregulation correlates with struc-
tural damage to the prefrontal cortex (Raine, Lencz,
Buhrle, LaCasse, & Colletti, 2000). In addition, dam-
age in the nucleus accumbens may be related to deficits
in the impulsive system (Cardinal, Pennicott,
Sugathapala, Robbins, & Everitt, 2001).
The notion that reflectively generated attitudes and
impulsive responses that express evaluations might be
due to the operation of different systems was recently
supported by a neuropsychological study conducted by
Phelps and her colleagues (Phelps et al., 2000). Based
on findings from brain imaging, it would appear that
amygdala activity was correlated with impulsive be-
havior indicating prejudice against African Americans,
while it was not correlated with reflective expressions
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4There were other conditions irrelevant to our discussion.
of racial attitudes. This suggests that the amygdala may
be capable of detecting stimulus valence extremely fast
(Morris, Öhman, & Dolan, 1998) and before it can be
processed by the reflective system. The distinction be-
tween flexible and fast acquisition of information in
the reflective system and slowly changing representa-
tions in the impulsive system was recently linked to
neocortical and hippocampal structures (J. L.
McClelland et al., 1995). Of course, these few exam-
ples are only a sketch of possible interconnections be-
tween the two lines of research. A more thorough anal-
ysis, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
Another area to which these principles can be ex-
tended is that of behavioral disorders. Until 1964, psy-
chological research on social and abnormal phenomena
was published in the same scientific journals. Since
then, however, normal and abnormal behaviors have
been seen as distinct categories and explained by differ-
ent theoretical models. From the perspective of the re-
flective–impulsive model, the difference between the
two types of behavior is only one of degree, not of kind.
What we call “abnormal” can often be described as the
chronic determination of a behavior through only one
operating system. One example is addiction, a psycho-
logical category that may not be confined to the abuse of
drugs, but may also describe behaviors that are difficult
to control by intention, such as overeating, gambling,
watching TV, or surfing the Internet. As another exam-
ple, phobic behaviors may be understood as being pre-
dominantly controlled by the impulsive system. The au-
tomatic associations of a stimulus with a fear response
(cf. Bouton, Mineka, & Barlow, 2001) may then be as-
sessed with implicit measures such as the Implicit Asso-
ciation Test (IAT; e.g., Teachman, Gregg, & Woody,
2001). Similarly, depression may be accompanied by an
automatic tendency to negatively evaluate information
that is relevant for the self. Results from the IAT suggest
that this is the case (Gemar, Segal, Sagrati, & Kennedy,
2001). Another example of application is panic reac-
tions of crowds. Here, arousal is predicted to diminish
reflective processing. At the same time, observing other
persons’ fearful expressions and flight behavior will
fuel own avoidance reactions, particularly fear and
flight and further enhance the arousal.
In conclusion, this conceptualization suggests that
social psychology should recognize the importance of
an impulsive determination of social behavior and study
its mechanisms, particularly its interaction with the re-
flective determinants that are the primary focus of our
theorizing. In this endeavor, it may be not enough to du-
plicate the processes or outcomes of the reflective sys-
tem and propose implicit decisions. Instead, it seems
necessary to study the unique mechanisms that drive the
system and understand its adaptive value in guiding be-
havior under suboptimal circumstances.
As mentioned at the outset, the notion that humans
are rational beings is only part of the truth. We know
that behavior is not only determined by its anticipated
consequences but also driven by forces outside of ra-
tional control. However, it is not sufficient to focus on
any one of these forces in isolation. To understand
what people do, it seems necessary to study the dynam-
ics of behavior as the result of interacting influences.
We have proposed that they originate from psychologi-
cal systems that obey different operational principles.
The reflective–impulsive model of social behavior we
have suggested is meant to provide a framework for
this endeavor. Future research will test its merits.
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